In een tekst uit 1926 beschreef Keynes het einde van het laissez-faire idee. De tekst had dan ook de simpele titel ‘The End of Laissez-Faire’. Het is echter duidelijk aan de hand van de zaken die hij schrijft, dat er toch serieuze problemen zijn om Keynes een liberaal te noemen.In een tekst uit 1926 beschreef Keynes het einde van hIn een tekst uit 1926 beschreef Keynes het einde van het laissez-faire idee. De tekst had dan ook de simpele titel ‘The End of Laissez-Faire’. Het is echter duidelijk aan de hand van de zaken die hij schrijft, dat er toch serieuze problemen zijn om Keynes een liberaal te noemen.
Het aantal schijnmetaforen is groot, maar op die zaken ga ik niet expliciet in. Het eerste dat ik zou willen opmerken, is zijn schijnvoorstelling van de argumentatie waarop laissez-faire steunt.
The beauty and the simplicity of such a theory are so great that it is easy to forget that it follows not from the actual facts, but from an incomplete hypothesis introduced for the sake of simplicity. Apart from other objections to be mentioned later, the conclusion that individuals acting independently for their own advantage will produce the greatest aggregate of wealth, depends on a variety of unreal assumptions to the effect that the processes of production and consumption are in no way organic, that there exists a sufficient foreknowledge of conditions and requirements, and that there are adequate opportunities of obtaining this foreknowledge. For economists generally reserve for a later stage of their argument the complications which arise - (1) when the efficient units of production are large relatively to the units of consumption, (2) when overhead costs or joint costs are present, (3) when internal economies tend to aggregation of production, (4) when the time required for adjustments is long, (5) when ignorance prevails over knowledge and (6) when monopolies and combinations interfere with equality in bargaining - they reserve, that is to say, for a later stage their analysis of the actual facts. Moreover, many of those who recognise that the simplified hypothesis does not accurately correspond to fact conclude nevertheless that it does 'represent what is ‘natural’ and therefore ideal.
They regard the simplified hypothesis as health, and the further complications as disease.
Er zijn enkele problemen met deze visie van Keynes. Ten eerste steunt het pleidooi voor laissez-faire helemaal niet op een visie van perfecte competitie. Het is waar dat je het model van perfecte competitie eenvoudig kan afdoen als irrelevant in de werkelijke wereld, om allerlei redenen. Maar dat model is niet de basis voor laissez-faire. Het argument voor laissez-faire zit in het comperatieve voordeel van het marktproces - vrijwilligheid - versus de staat - onvrijwilligheid - in de eerste instantie door de mogelijkheid van economische calculatie op basis van prijzen in het marktproces. In het marktproces heb je prijzen om je te laten leiden in je economische beslissingen, en een motivatie om je te laten leiden daardoor. Bij de staat heb je geen enkel het politieke mechanisme om je te laten leiden bij beslissingen; een mechanisme waarbij je fundamenteel de kosten laat dragen door de rest van de samenleving (belastingsbetaler) en waarbij jij de voordelen zoveel mogelijk naar je toe tracht te trekken, gecombineerd met ideologische ondersteun waarbij, indien je fout zit, je de kosten kan externaliseren naar de rest van de samenleving. (De these van Bryan Caplan over 'Rational Irrationality'.) Merk op dat Keynes enkel aantoont dat het mechanisme niet perfect is - zoals in het overeenkomstige model - maar dat hij niet aantoont dat het alternatief comparatief beter is. Dit is natuurlijk een quod non; hoe goed of slecht je een bepaald mechanisme ook vindt, om daaruit te concluderen dat je het mag verwerpen (wat je doet als je tegen 'laissez-faire' pleit), is een quod non. Je kan dat enkel doen door aan te tonen dat een alternatief comparatief beter is.
Keynes vervolgt:
Yet besides this question of fact there are other considerations, familiar enough, which rightly bring into the calculation the cost and character of the competitive struggle itself, and the tendency for wealth to be distributed where it is not appreciated most. If we have the welfare of the giraffes at heart, we must not overlook the sufferings of the shorter necks who are starved out, or the sweet leaves which fall to the ground and are trampled underfoot in the struggle, or the overfeeding of the long-necked ones, or the evil look of anxiety or struggling greediness which overcasts the mild faces of the herd.
Hier hanteert hij 2 argumenten. (1) Dat de minderbedeelden uit de boot gaan vallen en (2) dat hebzucht gaat leiden tot onregelmatigheden in de samenleving (zo lees ik toch zijn argument). 2elfs indien dit waar is, volgt daar, natuurlijk, niet uit dat je het marktproces moet reguleren. Daaruit volgt, hoogstens, dat je de staat kan gebruiken om middelen te herverdelen naar zij die het minder hebben. Maar het is natuurlijk zo dat in elke samenleving er voor de armen/zwakkeren werd gezorgd; als het niet door de staat was, dan wel door grotere en meer vrijwilligere organisaties. Dus is het een beetje absurd omdat te gebruiken als argument. Armere samenlevingen kunnen natuurlijk minder goed voor hun zwakkeren zorgen; er is minder om te herverdelen, maar dat neemt niet weg dat je het zelfs daar ziet.
Het tweede argument - het hebzucht argument - is ook raar. Ten eerste is het raar dat 'hebzucht' een argument zou zijn dat anderen niet zoveel zouden mogen verdienen. 'Hey, ik kan jaloers worden, dus werk eens niet zoveel.' Ten tweede is het ook niet duidelijk hoe je dat kan verbeteren door belastingen te heffen of te reguleren; dan verander je gewoon de setting waarin hebzucht kan teren; het fundamenteel uitdoven doe je niet. En het is ook natuurlijk niet gezegd dat je daardoor fundamenteel meer gelijkheid hebt; er zijn allerlei mechanismen actief in de moderne welvaartstaat die herverdelen van rijk naar arm, zoals onderwijs en arbeidsregulering.
En hij gaat verder:
Let us clear from the ground the metaphysical or general principles upon which, from time to time, laissez-faire has been founded. It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive ‘natural liberty’ in their economic activities. There is no ‘compact’ conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or on those who Acquire. The world is not so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is not so managed here below that in practice they coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. Experience does not show that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act separately.
Ik citeer dit om te illusteren: hoeveel argumenten tel je hier? De vraag stellen is ze voor 1 keer door de lezer laten beoordelen.
Ook grappig:
(1) I believe that in many cases the ideal size for the unit of control and organisation lies somewhere between the individual and the modern State. I suggest, therefore, that progress lies in the growth and the recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within the State-bodies whose criterion of action within their own field is solely the public good as they understand it, and from whose deliberations motives of private advantage are excluded, though some place it may still be necessary to leave, until the ambit of men's altruism grows wider, to the separate advantage of particular groups, classes, or faculties - bodies which in the ordinary course of affairs are mainly autonomous within their prescribed limitations, but are subject in the last resort to the sovereignty of the democracy expressed through Parliament.
I propose a return, it may be said, towards medieval conceptions of separate autonomies. But, in England at any rate, corporations are a mode of government which has never ceased to be important and is sympathetic to our institutions. It is easy to give examples, from what already exists, of separate autonomies which have attained or are approaching the mode I designate - the universities, the Bank of England, the Port of London Authority, even perhaps the railway companies. In Germany there are doubtless analogous instances.
One of the most interesting and unnoticed developments of recent decades has been the tendency of big enterprise to socialise itself. A point arrives in the growth of a big institution - particularly a big railway or big public utility enterprise, but also a big bank or a big insurance company - at which the owners of the capital, i.e. its shareholders, are almost entirely dissociated from the management, with the result that the direct personal interest of the latter in the making of great profit becomes quite secondary. When this stage is reached, the general stability and reputation of the institution are the more considered by the management than the maximum of profit for the shareholders.
The illusion that management is the totality of entrepreneurial activities and that management is a perfect substitute for entrepreneurship is the outgrowth of a misinterpretation of the conditions of the corporations, the typical form of present-day business. It is as- serted that the corporation is operated by the salaried managers, while the shareholders are merely passive spectators. All the powers are concentrated in the hands of hired employees. The shareholders are idle and useless; they harvest what the managers have sown.
This doctrine disregards entireIy the role that the capital and money market, the stock and bond exchange, which a pertinent idiom simply calls the "market," plays in the direction of corporate business. The dealings of this market are branded by popular anti- capitalistic bias as a hazardous game, as mere gambling. In fact, the changes in the prices of common and preferred stock and of corporate bonds are the means applied by the capitalists for the supreme control of the flow of capital. The price structure as determined by the speculations on the capital and money markets and on the big comnodity exchanges not only decides how much capital is available for the conduct of each corporation's business; it creates a state of affairs to which the managers must adjust their operations in detail.
The most important Agenda of the State relate not to those activities which private individuals are already fulfilling, but to those functions which fall outside the sphere of the individual, to those decisions which are made by no one if the State does not make them. The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all.
Many of the greatest economic evils of our time are the fruits of risk, uncertainty, and ignorance. It is because particular individuals, fortunate in situation or in abilities, are able to take advantage of uncertainty and ignorance, and also because for the same reason big business is often a lottery, that great inequalities of wealth come about; and these same factors are also the cause of the unemployment of labour, or the disappointment of reasonable business expectations, and of the impairment of efficiency and production. Yet the cure lies outside the operations of individuals; it may even be to the interest of individuals to aggravate the disease. I believe that the cure for these things is partly to be sought in the deliberate control of the currency and of credit by a central institution, and partly in the collection and dissemination on a great scale of data relating to the business situation, including the full publicity, by law if necessary, of all business facts which it is useful to know. These measures would involve society in exercising directive intelligence through some appropriate organ of action over many of the inner intricacies of private business, yet it would leave private initiative and enterprise unhindered. Even if these measures prove insufficient, nevertheless, they will furnish us with better knowledge than we have now for taking the next step.
My second example relates to savings and investment. I believe that some coordinated act of intelligent judgement is required as to the scale on which it is desirable that the community as a whole should save, the scale on which these savings should go abroad in the form of foreign investments, and whether the present organisation of the investment market distributes savings along the most nationally productive channels. I do not think that these matters should be left entirely to the chances of private judgement and private profits, as they are at present.
My third example concerns population. The time has already come when each country needs a considered national policy about what size of population, whether larger or smaller than at present or the same, is most expedient. And having settled this policy, we must take steps to carry it into operation. The time may arrive a little later when the community as a whole must pay attention to the innate quality as well as to the mere numbers of its future members.
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